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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
KARL R. LYMAN and EDITH K.
LYMAN, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NATIONAL MORTGAGE BOND CORPORATION, a corporation of the State
of Delaware, AMALIA V. YBARRA,
personally; AMALIA V. YBARRA, as
Administratrix of the Estate of Tomas
Velarde, Deceased; SAN JUAN COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the
State of Utah, and all other persons
unknown claiming right, title, estate or
interest in or lien upon the real property described in the complaint adverse
to Plaintiffs' ownership or clouding
D ef endants.
Plaintiffs' title thereto,

Case No. 8633

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a decree of the District Court of
San Juan County quieting plaintiffs' title to several tracts of
land. The only tract in which the appellants are interested
3
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is the SEl~ of the SEl~ of Section 31, Township 32 South,
Range 24 East, SLB&M. This tract was patented to one Tomas
Velarde on June 13, 1922. The abstract of title, Plaintiffs'
Exhibit A, shows no conveyance from Tomas Velarde to the
plaintiffs or to their predecessors. However, entry 3 of the
abstract is a (<tax deed" dated December 12, 1941, from
Frank Halls as County Clerk and also as County Auditor to
one J. M. Bailey. This deed recites that the County got title
by an auditor's tax deed dated March 25, 1927. There is no
auditor's tax deed to the County shown in the abstract. The
plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of J. M. Bailey.
If we assume for the sake of discussion of the facts that
the auditor's tax deed was actually delivered on March 25,
1927, it would have to have been based on a sale for failure
to pay 1922 taxes. Any tax levy in 1922 would be void because as shown by defendants' Exhibit 1, the homestead proceedings were in the early stages on January 1, 1922, and the
property was not taxable on that date. It was part of the
public domain.
It was stipulated by the attorney for the plaintiffs that the
auditor's affidavit required by Title 59, Chapter 8, Section 7,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 \vas not attached to the assessment roll (Trans. 10). The case was tried upon the assumption
that the tax title was void and that the only theory upon which
the plaintiffs could prevail was that they had acquired a title
by adverse possession. The testimony of Karl R. Lyman (Trans.
5-9) shows all of the elements necessary to prove title by
adverse possession, except one. The plaintiffs failed to show
payment of nall the taxes which have been levied and assessed

4
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upon such land according to law." The plaintiffs offered in
evidence Exhibit B, as follows:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the taxes on the following described
real estate situated in San Juan County, State of Utah, were
paid as below indicated:
Towns hip 32 South, Range 24 East, SLM, Section 31:
The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter.
Year

Date Paid

By Whom Paid

Redeemed By

Karl R. Lyman
9-29-55
Karl R. Lyman
Tax sale
11-13-53 Karl R. Lyman
11-29-52 Wallace Bailey
Karl R. Lyman
Tax sale
Not shown
9-22-50
Tax sale
Mrs. Arthur Holt
Tax sale
11-3-47
Reta Bailey
Tax sale
K. R., Bailey
Tax sale
12-4-44 K. R. Bailey
11-30-43 J. M. Bailey
11-6-42
J. M. Bailey
No Tax Charged, County Land on January 1,

1955
1954
1953
1952
1951
1950
1949
1948
1947
1946
1945
1944
1943
1942
1941

Date

5-17-56
5-17-56
9-22-50

2-20-47

1941.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 14th day of
September, 1956.
(Seal)

Is/ Joy James
Joy James, Treasurer
San Juan County, Utah
The trial court made the usual finding of fact as to the
color of title, and that the plaintiffs and their predecessors
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have had ((sole, exclusive, open, notorious and hostile possession
of the said land" since 1941, and
((6. That from December 12, 1941 to date of judgment,
the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest have paid all
taxes assessed against said parcel No. 1." Elsewhere in the
findings of fact it is stated that parcel No. 1 is the land involved in this appeal.
The decree is in the usual form quieting title in the plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. Payment of taxes each year for the statutory period

before they become delinquent is necessary to establish title
by adverse possession.
2. The plaintiffs still have the burden of proving all

elements of adverse possession despite the 1951 amendments
to the statute relating to limitation of actions.
3. There is no proof that the plaintiffs are Hholders of a
tax title'' within the meaning of the statute.

ARGUMENT
1. PAYMENT OF TAXES EACH YEAR FOR THE

STATUTORY PERIOD IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH
TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.
Exhibit B, copied above, shows that neither the plaintiffs
nor their predecessors in interest paid taxes before they became
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delinquent for any period of more than three consecutive years
since the county deeded the land to]. M. Bailey in 1941. There
was only one time when taxes were paid for three consecutive
years namely 1942, 1943 and 1944. Tax sales for two years
intervened in 1945 and 1946. Since 1946 there was only once
when the taxes were paid for two consecutive years before
they became delinquent. The evidence is, therefore, clear that
taxes were not paid every year for seven years to meet the
requirement of section 78-12-12.1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
or for four years to meet the requirement of the proviso of
said section. Redemption is not ((payment" within the meaning
of the statute.
It is well established by the case of Bowen v. Olsen, 2
U ( 2d) 12, 268 P. 2d 983, that the language ((payment of
taxes" in section 78-12-12 U.C.A. 1953 requires the payment
of taxes before they become delinquent in order to establish
a title by adverse possession. The redemption from a tax sale
cannot be considered the payment of taxes. After reviewing
the authorities the court said:
((For the foregoing reasons we hold that the redemption of the property from the County in 1949 did not
meet the requirement of the statute as to the payment
of taxes in 1947 and 1948, and therefore the trial court
properly held that the plaintiffs failed to establish their
claim to the land in question by adverse possession.''
The statute construed by the Court in the Bowen case
was amended by Laws of Utah, 1951, Chapter 19, to provide
as follows: See pocket part, Vol. 9, DCA 1953, p. 9)
78-12-12.1.
7
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Possession and payment of taxes-Priviso-Tax title.
-In no case shall adverse possession be established
under the provisions of this Code, unless it shall be
known that the land has been occupied and claimed
for the period of seven years cont~nuousl y, and that
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all
the taxes which have been levied and assessed upon
such land according to law. Provided, however, that
payment by the holder of a tax title to real property
or his predecessors, of all the taxes levied and assessed
upon such real property after the delinquent tax sale
or transfer under which he claims for a period of not
less than four years and for not less than one year
after the effective date of this amendment, shall be
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this section in
regard to the payment of taxes necessary to establish
adverse possession.
It will be noted that the amended statute still requires the
rr payment of taxes" for a period of not less than four years
to establish a case of adverse possession. The words ((according
to law" are not repeated in the proviso but the words ((payment
of taxes" are repeated. It will be observed that in the Bowen
case this Court based its decision on the words Hpayment of
taxes" and did not pay any attention to the words ((according
to law." The Court said.
More aligned with reason and persuasion are the
grounds courts have given as a basis for adopting the
majority rule: HPayment of taxes" and ''redemption
of taxes" have two separate and well defined meanings; redemption is not "payment" because it is only
where the taxes have not been ttpaid" that there is
a forfeiture and any need for redemption; a payment
made after the land has been sold for taxes is not
made to discharge a claim for taxes but to redeem the
8
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land from the sale and reinvest the owner with legal
title.
In view of the failure of plaintiffs to show payment of
taxes for more than three consecutive years, they have failed
to prove adverse possession-the only possible theory under
which they can succeed.
2. THE PLAINTIFFS STILL HAVE THE BURDEN

OF PROVING ALL ELEMENTS OF ADVERSE POSSESSION DESPITE THE 1951 AMENDMENTS TO THE
STATUTE RELATING TO LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
It is elementary that in a quiet title action the plaintiff
tnust rely upon the strength of his own title and not the weakness of the defendants' title.
In 74 C.J.S., p. 41 the rule is stated as follows:
As a general rule, one seeking to quiet title or remove a cloud thereon must succeed on the strength of
his own title, and not on the weakness of his adversary's title, and want of title in plaintiff ordinarii y
renders it unnecessary to examine that of defendant.
This means that if the quiet title action is based upon
the doctrine of adverse possession all elements must be proved
by the plaintiffs to make a case.
It was contended in the district court that sections 78-12-5.1
and 78-12-5.2 prevent the interposing of any defense to this
suit by the defendants because they had not actually occupied
or been in possession of the property within four years prior
to the commencement or interposition of such action or defense.
These sections provide:
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

78-12-5.1-No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall be maintained,
unless the plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or
possessed of such property within seven years from the
commencement of such action; provided, however, that
with respect to actions or defenses brought or interposed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet title
or determine the ownership of real property against
the holder of a tax title to such property, no such action
or defense shall be commenced or interposed more than
four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance,
or transfer creating such tax title unless the person commencing or interposing such action or defense or his
predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession
of such property within four years prior to the commencement or interposition of such action or defense
or within one year from the effective date of this
amendment.
78-12-5.2-No action or defense for the recovery or
possession of real property or to quiet title or determine
the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from the date of th sale, conveyance
or transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly
to any other purchaser thereof at any public or private
tax sale and after the expiration of one year from the
date of this act. Provided, however, that this section
shall not bar any action or defense by the owner of the
legal title to such property where he or his predecessor
has actually occupied or been in actual possession of
such property within four years from the commencement or interposition of such action or defense. And
proyided further, that this section shall not bar any
defense by a city or town, to an action by the holder
of a tax title, to the effect that such city or town holds
a lien against such property which is equal or superior
to the claim of the holder of such tax title.
10
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It is settled that statutes of limitations must be pleaded
or covered by a pre-trial order or discussion; otherwise they
are deemed waived. In this case they were not pleaded, nor was
there any pre-trial. They must therefore be considered waived.
If we assume for the sake of argument only that they
are to be considered, it is apparent that they are not applicible
to this case.
The legislature obviously intended to permit the pleading
of the statute of limitations to obviate the necessity of proving
all of the steps necessary to show a good tax title where the
tax deed was given more than four years prior to the commencement of the suit. Here that question did not come up
because the plaintiffs stipulated facts t'hat made the tax title
invalid, and they relied only upon a title by adverse possession.
The limitations statutes have no application for a further
reason. Under the provisions of section 78-12-7.1 (Vol. 9,
Pocket Parts, p. 9), the person establishing a legal title is presumed to have been possessed of land within the time required
by law. There is a ((proviso" for the benefit of a tax title holder
under which he is presumed to be the owner unless ( 1) the
owner of the legal title has actually occupied the land, or
( 2) the tax title owner has failed to pay taxes within the four
year period. The ((proviso" does not apply in this case because
the (<tax title owner" has failed to pay all taxes levied or
assessed within the four year period. The statute is quoted
with emphasis added:
78-12-7.1-Adverse possession- PresumptionProviso-Tax Title.-In every action for the recovery
or possession of real property or to quiet title to or to
11
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determine the owner thereof the person establishing
a legal title to such property shall be presumed to have
been possessed thereof within the time required by law;
and the occupation of such property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that such
property has been held and possessed adversely to such
legal title for seven years before the commencement
of such action. Provided, however, that if in any action
any party shall establish prima facie evidence that he
is the owner of any real property under a tax title held
by him and his predecessors for four years prior to the
commencement of such action and one year after the
effective date of this amendment he shall be presumed
to be the owner of such property by adverse possession
unless it appears that the owner of the legal title or
his predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession of such property under such title, or that such tax
title owner and his predecessors have failed to pay
all the taxes levied or assessed upon such property
within such· four year period.
It will be noted that the words rrto pay'' are used, and the
Supreme Court has held that redemption is not the equivalent
of payment. The plaintiffs cannot show four years of payment
of taxes, so under 78-12-7.1 the Velarde Estate was presumed
to have been in possession. Under the plain reading of the
statute the plaintiffs can succeed only by sho\\ring adverse
possession and payment of taxes for seven years.
The plaintiffs are attempting, in effect, to use the limitations statutes quoted above to bolster an inadequate showing
under the adverse possession statutes. This, they cannot do.
Unless the plaintiffs make a case, it is unnecessary for the
defendants to interpose any defense. The title of the Velarde
'
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Estate has not been defeated, and the estate is still the owner
of the property.
3. THERE IS NO PROOF THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
ARE HOLDERS OF A nTAX TITLE" WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE STATUTE.
Section 78-12-5.3 provides in part as follows:
The term ((tax title" as used in section 78-12-5.2 and
section 59-10-65, and the related amended sections
78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to real
property, whether valid or not, which has been derived
through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance or
transfer of such property in the course of a statutory
proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against
such property whereby the property is relieved from a
tax lien.
The abstract of title, Exhibit A, is the only proof of title
offered by the plaintiffs. It does not contain an auditor's tax
deed to San Juan County so there is a gap in the title between
Tomas Velarde and San Juan County. Furthermore, as indicated above the plaintiffs do not claim title by virtue of a tax
deed, but merely claim that the deed clothed them with color
of title sufficient to show adverse possession. If we assume
for the sake of argument that the limitations statutes are applicable to this case, the plaintiffs have failed to prove that
they are holders of a tax title as defined by section 78-12-5.3.
No sale, conveyance, or transfer of the propertr involved from
Velarde to the County has been proved and this is essential
to proof of a ((tax title" even under the liberal language of
the statute.
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CONCLUSION
It is clear that no title by adverse possession was proved
by the plaintiffs by reason of their failure to prove the payment
of taxes, and the Velarde Estate is still the owner of the
property. The decree of the district court should be reversed
and the court directed to enter a decree in favor of the defendant, as administratrix of the Velarde Estate.
Respectfully submitted,

E.

J. SKEEN
Attorney for Appellants
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